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Abstract 
Recent financial turmoil and existing empirical evidence suggest that adverse shocks to the 
financial intermediary (FI) sector cause substantial economic downturns. The quantitative 
significance of these shocks to the U.S. business cycle, however, has not received much 
attention up to now. To determine the importance of these shocks, we estimate a 
sticky-price dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with what we describe as 
chained credit contracts. In this model, credit-constrained FIs intermediate funds from 
investors to credit-constrained entrepreneurs through two types of credit contract. Using 
Bayesian estimation, we extract the shocks to the FIs' net worth. The shocks are cyclical, 
typically negative during a recession, such as the one that began in 2007. Their effects are 
persistent, lowering economic activity for several quarters after the recessionary trough. 
According to the variance decomposition, shocks to the FI sector are a main source of the 
spread variations, explaining 39% of the FIs' borrowing spread and 23% of the 
entrepreneurial borrowing spread. At the same time, these shocks play an important but 
not dominant role for investment, accounting for 15% of its variations. 
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The ￿nancial crisis that began in the fall of 2007 demonstrated that ￿nancial intermediaries
(hereafter, FIs) play a crucial role in economic activity. Adverse shocks to the FI sector
increase the borrowing costs for FIs by deteriorating their net worth. Consequently, the
supply of funds to entrepreneurs tightens, leading to an investment decline and a further
deterioration in the FIs￿net worth. This account is consistent with the literature that focuses
on the relationship between the FI sector and the aggregate economy. For example, Peek
and Rosengren (1997, 2000), using a novel identi￿cation scheme for a loan supply shock,
report that the worsening of FIs￿net worth generates economic downturns.
However, there is as yet no body of literature determining how important the shocks
to the FI sector are to the U.S. business cycle. While macroeconomists agree that shocks
to the credit market are an important source of aggregate ￿ uctuations, to the best of our
knowledge only a limited number of studies have evaluated the relative impact of shocks to
the FI sector.1 In the existing models, shocks to entrepreneurial net worth are primarily
focused on and shocks to the FIs￿net worth are often neglected.
To assess the role of the shocks to the FIs￿net worth, we estimate the ￿nancial acceler-
ator model of Hirakata, Sudo, and Ueda (2009a, 2009b, hereafter HSU). Our model is built
upon the ￿nancial accelerator model in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999, hereafter
BGG) where endogenous developments in the entrepreneurial net worth play an important
role in amplifying and propagating exogenous shocks. The credit-constrained FIs interme-
diate funds from investors to credit-constrained entrepreneurs through two types of credit
contracts: the FIs￿borrowing contract with investors and the FIs￿lending contract with
entrepreneurs. Because the two contracts are chained, the borrowing cost for the entrepre-
neurs depends on the two contracts, and in turn, the net worth of the two credit-constrained
sectors. Consequently, the ￿nancial accelerator e⁄ect is enhanced due to developments in
the FIs￿net worth along with the entrepreneurial net worth.
Based on HSU (2009a, 2009b), we distill the shocks to the FIs￿net worth using a Bayesian
technique. We employ a set of U.S. macroeconomic variables consisting of output, consump-
1See, for example, Gilchrist, Yankov, and Zakrajsek (2009) and Jermann and Quardini (2009). The notable
exceptions are Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (hereafter CMR, 2007, 2008), who analyze the shocks to the
production functions of banks separately from the shocks to entrepreneurs. While other empirical work, such
as Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000), emphasizes the balance-sheet e⁄ect in the FI sector, the banks in CMR
(2008) are competitive and do not own their net worth. In contrast, we focus on the shocks to FIs￿net worth
and their impact on the aggregate economy.
1tion, investment, in￿ ation, the policy rate, and the net worth of both the FI and entrepre-
neurial sectors.2 The sample period runs from 1984Q1 to 2009Q2, and therefore covers the
most recent turmoil in the credit market. We ￿nd that the estimated adverse shocks to the
FIs￿net worth typically take large negative values during the recession, and are positively
correlated with a number of indicators of credit market stress.
A negative shock to the FIs￿net worth causes an upsurge in borrowing spreads and a
persistent decline in investment. In particular, during the several quarters since 2007, the
shocks to the FIs￿net worth have been unprecedentedly deep and persistent, contributing
to a drastic widening in the borrowing spreads in that period. Their impacts on investment
last long, lowering it for several quarters after the end of the recession.
The decomposition of the historical contributions of structural shocks suggests that the
adverse shocks to the FI sector are one of the main sources of the variations in the borrowing
spreads, and are an important but not dominant source of the variations in investment. They
account for 39% of the variations in the FIs￿borrowing spread and 23% of the variations in
the entrepreneurial borrowing spread. At the same time, the relative contributions of these
shocks to investment, output, and in￿ ation, respectively, are 15%, 3%, and 4% of overall
variations.
Research using the ￿nancial accelerator model commonly poses one or both of two ques-
tions.3 The ￿rst concerns about the quantitative importance of the shocks originating in the
credit market, and the second concerns the quantitative importance of the ￿nancial accel-
erator e⁄ect. For instance, in response to the ￿rst question, Nolan and Thoenissen (2009)
report that shocks to the credit market account for 45% of the investment variations. In
response to the second question, Christensen and Dib (2008) conclude that the ￿nancial ac-
celerator mechanism brings the sticky-price dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model closer to the data. However, they also point out that its quantitative contribution is
small.4
By adding to the model credit-constrained FIs and shocks to their net worth, we provide
more extensive answers to the two questions. First, consistent with the existing literature,
our result implies that shocks originating in the credit market substantially a⁄ect the macro-
2As discussed below, we conduct several sensitivity analyses of the choice of observable variables.
3See, for example, CMR (2008), Meier and Muller (2006), Christensen and Dib (2008), De Graeve (2008),
and Nolan and Thoenissen (2009).
4Meier and Muller (2006) derive a similar conclusion that the ￿nancial accelerator e⁄ect is small by
investigating impulse response functions to monetary policy shocks using U.S. data.
2economy. However, a sizable amount of the estimated shocks to the credit market originates
in the FI sector. Second, in comparing ￿t with the data, we ￿nd that our model, in which
both FIs and entrepreneurs are credit constrained, outperforms the model in which only the
entrepreneurs are credit constrained. Our comparison suggests that the ￿nancial accelerator
mechanism linked to endogenous developments in the FIs￿net worth is an important element
in explaining the data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our economy.
In Section 3, we describe the estimation method and the results. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Economy
We consider an economy with a credit market and a goods market. The economy consists
of 10 types of agents: investors, FIs, entrepreneurs, a household, ￿nal goods producers,
retailers, wholesalers, capital goods producers, the government, and the monetary authority.
The setting for the credit market is taken from HSU (2009a). There are three types
of participants in the credit market: investors, FIs, and entrepreneurs. Investors collect
deposits from the household in a competitive market, and invest what they collect in loans
to the FIs. FIs are the monopolistic lenders of funds to entrepreneurs. FIs own their net
worth, but not su¢ ciently to ￿nance their loans to the entrepreneurs. Therefore, they make
credit contracts with investors to borrow the rest of the funds. Entrepreneurs invest in their
projects, and also own their net worth, but not su¢ ciently to ￿nance them. Thus, they
make credit contracts with FIs to borrow the funds. Clearly, these two types of contracts
are linked in the economy, and entrepreneurs cannot ￿nance their projects if either of the
credit contracts fails to hold.
Monopolistic FIs determine the borrowing rates of the credit contracts, thereby ensuring
the participation constraints of entrepreneurs and investors. Agency problems arise from the
asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers for both of the credit contracts, one
between FIs and entrepreneurs (hereafter, FE contracts) and the other between investors
and FIs (hereafter, IF contracts).5 Consequently, the borrowing rates of the credit contracts
5Our setting thus contrasts with other banking models based on the moral hazard problems of FIs and
entrepreneurs (Chen, 2001; Meh and Moran, 2004; and Aikman and Paustian, 2006). These studies all
develop quantitative extensions of the model in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and illustrate the role of net
worth in the banking sector. Importantly, in their model a rise in net worth mitigates the moral hazard
problem, and a⁄ects aggregate investment by changing the incentive compatibility conditions. Our model,
on the other hand, stresses the role of net worth in a⁄ecting the borrowing rates of the credit contracts.
3change with the net worth of the borrowers.
We closely follow BGG (1999) for the setup of the goods market. There are four goods
in the economy: ￿nal goods, retail goods, wholesale goods, and capital goods. Final goods
are produced by ￿nal goods producers from di⁄erentiated retail goods through the Dixit-
Stiglitz aggregator. Retail goods are produced from wholesale goods by monopolistic retail
goods producers that set the prices of their goods following Calvo (1983). Wholesale goods
are produced by competitive wholesalers that own a Cobb-Douglas production technology
that converts capital and labor inputs into wholesale goods. Capital goods are produced by
capital goods producers and sold to the entrepreneurs. In what follows, we brie￿ y describe
our setting of the credit market and fully explain the goods market.
2.1 The Credit Market
Overview of the two types of credit contract
In this section, we describe the framework of the credit contracts. In each period, en-






























; from the FIs through the FE contracts. The FIs also





















; from investors through the IF contracts. In both contracts, agency prob-
lems stemming from asymmetric information are present. That is, the borrowers are subject
to idiosyncratic productivity shocks and the lenders cannot observe the realizations of these
shocks without paying additional costs.6 Taking these credit market imperfections as given,
the FIs choose the clauses of the two contracts that maximize their expected pro￿ts. Con-
sequently, for a given riskless rate of the economy R
￿
st￿









Consequently, the theoretical relationship between the net worth of borrowers and their borrowing rates is
explicitly given.
6The idiosyncratic productivity shocks for the FIs and the entrepreneurs are log-normally distributed with




































ratio of the debt to the size of the capital investment















































































are the cuto⁄ value for the FIs￿idiosyncratic shock !F ￿
st+1￿
in the IF contract, and that for the entrepreneurial idiosyncratic shock !E ￿
st+1￿
in the
FE contract.7 Equation (1) is a key equation that links the net worth of the borrowing
7Similarly to BGG (1999) and CMR (2008), the aggregation problem of the FIs and the entrepreneurs
becomes tractable thanks to the property of optimal credit contracts where the ratio of net worth to capital
is the same within FIs and within entrepreneurs.
5sectors to the external ￿nance premium. The external ￿nance premium is determined by
three components: the share of pro￿t in the IF contract going to the investors, the share of
pro￿t in the FE contract going to the FIs, and the ratio of total debt to aggregate capital.
Lower pro￿t shares going to the lenders cause a higher external ￿nance premium through the
￿rst two terms of equation (1): Otherwise, the participation constraints of investors would
not be met and ￿nancial intermediation fails. A higher ratio of the debt results in higher
external costs, since it raises default probability of the IF contracts and investors require
higher returns from the IF contracts to satisfy their participation constraint. The presence
of the ￿rst two channels suggests that not only the sum of both net worths but also the
distribution of the two net worths matter in determining the external ￿nance premium.8
Borrowing rates
The two credit borrowing rates, namely, the entrepreneurial borrowing rate and the FIs￿
borrowing rate, are given by the FE and the IF contracts, respectively. The entrepreneur-
ial borrowing rate, denoted by ZE ￿
st+1jst￿
; is given as the contractual interest rate that














Q(st)K (st) ￿ NE (st)
: (4)
Clearly, the numerator stands for the amount that the nondefaulting entrepreneurs repay to
the FIs, and the denominator for the amount of funds that entrepreneurs borrow from the
FIs.
Similarly, the FIs￿borrowing rate, denoted by ZF ￿
st+1jst￿
; is given by the contractual

















Q(st)K (st) ￿ NF (st) ￿ NE (st)
; (5)
In equation (5), the numerator is the amount that the nondefaulting FIs repay to the in-
vestors, and the denominator is the amount of funds that the FIs borrow from the investors.
Dynamic behavior of net worth




; depends on their earnings
from the credit contracts and their labor income. In addition to the pro￿ts stemming from
entrepreneurial projects, both FIs and entrepreneurs inelastically supply a unit of labor to




















. As we assume that
each FI and entrepreneur survives to the next period with a constant probability ￿F and
￿E; then the aggregate net worths of FIs and entrepreneurs are given by
NF ￿
st+1￿




























































2.2 The Rest of the Economy
Household























































is ￿nal goods consumption, H
￿
st￿




held by the investors, W
￿
st￿




real risk-free return from the deposit D
￿
st￿




received from the ownership of retailers, and T
￿
st￿
is a lump-sum transfer. ￿ 2 (0;1); ￿;
and ￿ are the subjective discount factor, the elasticity of leisure, and the utility weight on
leisure, respectively. eB(st) is a preference shock with mean one that provides the stochastic
variation in the discount factor.














The ￿nal goods Y
￿
st￿




goods producer purchases retail goods in the competitive market, and sells the output to a






is the aggregate price of the ￿nal















































by retailer h 2 [0;1]: The retailers are price takers in the input market and choose
their inputs taking the input price 1=X
￿
st￿
as given. However, they are monopolistic sup-
pliers in their output market, and set their prices to maximize pro￿ts. Consequently, the















Retailers are subject to nominal rigidity. They can change prices in a given period only
with probability (1 ￿ ￿); following Calvo (1983). Retailers who cannot reoptimize their price


























: ￿ denotes a steady state in￿ ation rate, and ￿p 2 [0;1] is a parame-
ter that governs the size of price indexation. Denoting the price set by the active retailers
8by P￿ ￿
h;st￿
and the demand curve the active retailer faces in period t + l by Y ￿ ￿
h;st+l￿
,























































Using equations (9);(10); and (11); the ￿nal goods Y
￿
st￿
produced in period t are





























evolves according to the following law of motion:
P
￿










The wholesalers produce wholesale goods yt
￿
st￿









; and HE ￿
st￿
;
and borrow capital K
￿
st￿1￿
: These labor inputs are supplied by the household, the FIs, and





; and WE ￿
st￿
; respectively. Capital is supplied
by the entrepreneurs with the rental price RE ￿
st￿
: At the end of each period, the capital is
sold back to the entrepreneurs at price Q
￿
st￿



























































denotes the level of technology of wholesale production and ￿ 2 (0;1],
￿; ￿F and ￿E are the depreciation rate of capital goods, the capital share, the share of the
FIs￿labor inputs, and the share of entrepreneurial labor inputs, respectively.
Capital goods producers
The capital goods producers own the technology that converts ￿nal goods to capital
goods. In each period, the capital goods producers purchase I
￿
st￿
amounts of ￿nal goods
from the ￿nal goods producers. In addition, they purchase K
￿
st￿1￿
(1 ￿ ￿) of used capital
goods from the entrepreneurs at price Q
￿
st￿






























































Note that ￿ is a parameter that is associated with investment technology with an adjustment
cost, where eI(st) is the shock to the adjustment cost.10 Here, the development in the total



























at the end of the period. This is because we assume, following BGG (1999), that the price of old capital that









around the steady state.
10The government collects a lump-sum tax from the household T
￿
st￿
















where eG(st) is the stochastic component of government spending.
Monetary authority
In our baseline model, the monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate Rn ￿
st￿
;




















where ￿ is the autoregressive parameter of the policy rate, ￿￿ and ￿y are the policy weight on
in￿ ation rate of ￿nal goods ￿
￿
st￿





; respectively, and eR(st)
is the shock to the monetary policy rule. Because the monetary authority determines the



























































Note that the fourth and the ￿fth terms on the right-hand side of the equation correspond
to the monitoring costs incurred by FIs and investors, respectively. The last two terms are
the FIs￿and entrepreneurs￿consumption.
Law of motion for exogenous variables
























































; and "R ￿
st￿
are innovations that are mutually independent,







In addition, we consider shocks to the credit market, following Gilchrist and Leahy
(2002). We assume that both FIs and entrepreneurs face an unexpected disruption (rise) in




: These innovations directly a⁄ect net worth
accumulation through equations (6) and (7). As discussed in Nolan and Thoenissen (2009),
we interpret these shocks to the net worth as a shock to the e¢ ciency of the contractual
relations in the IF contract and the FE contract, respectively.11
2.3 Equilibrium Condition
An equilibrium consists of a set of prices, fP
￿
h;st￿











































































realization of exogenous variables f"A ￿
st￿








and initial conditions NF
￿1; NE
￿1; K￿1 such that for all t and h:
11CMR (2008) and Nolan and Thoenissen (2009) assume that the exit ratio of entrepreneurs ￿
E obeys
the stochastic law of motion, generating an unexpected change in entrepreneurial net worth. CMR (2008)
interprets these shocks as a reduced form of an ￿asset bubble￿or ￿irrational exuberance.￿
12(1) the household maximizes its utility given the prices;
(2) the FIs maximize their pro￿ts given the prices;
(3) the entrepreneurs maximize their pro￿ts given the prices;
(4) the ￿nal goods producers maximize their pro￿ts given the prices;
(5) the retail goods producers maximize their pro￿ts given the prices;
(6) the wholesale goods producers maximize their pro￿ts given the prices;
(7) the capital goods producers maximize their pro￿ts given the prices;
(8) the government budget constraint holds; and
(9) markets clear.
3 Estimation
Following Christensen and Dib (2008), we set some of the parameters to the values used
in the existing studies. These include the quarterly discount factor ￿; the labor supply
elasticity ￿; the capital share ￿; the quarterly depreciation rate ￿; and the steady state
share of government expenditure in total output G=Y . See Table 1 for the values of these
parameters.
In addition, we calibrate six parameters for the credit contracts: the lenders￿monitoring
cost in the IF contract ￿F, the lenders￿monitoring cost in the FE contract ￿E; the standard
error of the idiosyncratic productivity shock in the FI sector ￿F, the standard error of the
idiosyncratic productivity shock in the entrepreneurial sector ￿E, the survival rate of FIs ￿F;
and the survival rate of entrepreneurs ￿E, so that the following six equilibrium conditions
are met at the steady state:
(1) the risk spread, RE ￿ R; is 200 basis points annually;
(2) the ratio of net worth held by FIs to the aggregate capital, NF=QK, is 0.1, a historical
average in the U.S. economy;
(3) the ratio of net worth held by entrepreneurs to the aggregate capital, NE=QK, is
0.5, a historical average in the U.S. economy;
(4) the annualized failure rate of FIs is 2%;
(5) the annualized failure rate of entrepreneurs is 2%;
(6) the spread between the entrepreneurial borrowing rate and the FIs￿borrowing rate
ZE￿ZF is 235 basis points annually, which is the historical average of the di⁄erence between
the prime lending rate and the rate on six-month certi￿cates of deposit for the estimation
13period.
Equilibrium conditions (1), (3), and (5) are met in BGG (1999), also. As our model
incorporates credit-constrained FIs, along with the credit-constrained entrepreneurs, our
economy satis￿es equilibrium conditions (2), (4), and (6). The six conditions above imply
that the FIs￿borrowing spread ZF ￿R equals 55 basis points annually, which is the average
of the di⁄erence between the rate on six-month CDs and the six-month Treasury bill rate
(TB rate) from for the estimation period.
We estimate the rest of parameters of the model using a Bayesian method. Estimated
parameters are the frequency of price adjustment ￿; the degree of price indexation ￿p, a
parameter that controls the capital adjustment cost ￿; the coe¢ cients of the policy rule ￿;
￿￿ and ￿y; the autoregressive parameters of the shock process ￿A; ￿I; ￿B; ￿G; and ￿R, the





R; as well as the variances of the shocks to
net worth ￿2
NF and ￿2
NE: To calculate the posterior distribution and to evaluate the marginal
likelihood of the model, the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is employed. To do this, a sample
of 200,000 draws was created, neglecting the ￿rst 100,000 draws.12
3.1 Data
Our dataset includes seven time series for the U.S. economy from 1984Q1 to 2009Q2: namely,
real GDP, real consumption, real investment, the log di⁄erence of the GDP de￿ ator, the fed-
eral funds (FF) rate, the net worth of the FI sector and the net worth of the entrepreneurial
sector. The last two variables are calculated from ￿corporate equities + equity in noncorpo-
rate business sector￿held by the ￿nancial business sector and ￿corporate equities + equity
in noncorporate business sector￿held by the non￿nancial business sector, respectively. All
of the variables other than the log di⁄erence of the GDP de￿ ator and the FF rate are ￿rst
di⁄erenced. Following CMR (2008), we impose the condition that the mean in the model
coincides with the mean in the data. In estimating the model, we remove the sample mean
of the growth rate of real GDP, real consumption, real investment and net worth, and the
level of the FF rate, and the log di⁄erence of the GDP de￿ ator. We depict all data series
used in the estimation in Figure 1.
12All estimations are done with Dynare.
143.2 Prior and Posterior Distribution of the Parameters
Table 2 reports the results of the parameter estimates with their prior distribution. The
adjustment cost parameter for investment ￿ is normally distributed with a mean of 4.0 and
a standard error of 1.5; the Calvo probability ￿ is beta distributed with a mean of 0.5 and a
standard error of 0.15; the degree of indexation to past in￿ ation ￿p is beta distributed with
a mean of 0.5 and a standard error of 0.2; the policy weight on the lagged policy rate ￿ is
normally distributed with a mean of 0.75 and a standard error of 0.1; the policy weight on
the in￿ ation ￿￿ is normally distributed with a mean of 1.5 and a standard error of 0.125;
and the policy weight on the output gap ￿y is normally distributed with a mean of 0.125
and a standard error of 0.05.
The priors on the stochastic processes of the exogenous shocks are set to follow an AR(1)
process with autoregressive parameters ￿A; ￿I; ￿B; ￿G; and ￿R, which are beta distributed








R are assumed to follow an inverse-
gamma distribution with a mean of 0.01.
The last three columns in Table 2 display the posterior mean and the con￿dence intervals
of the model parameters. For the investment adjustment cost, we obtain ￿ = 7:21. This
value falls between the estimates of 0.65 (Meier and Muller, 2006) and 32.1 (Ireland, 2003)
in existing studies. Our estimates of the degree of nominal price rigidity are ￿ = 0:79 and
￿p = 0:10; these values are smaller than the ￿ndings in Meier and Muller (2006). The
estimated monetary policy rule exhibits aggressive reaction to current in￿ ation ￿￿ = 1:47;
with inertia of the interest rate ￿ = 0:74; and mild reaction to current output ￿y = 0:04.
Table 2 also includes the shock processes of the seven exogenous variables. The government
expenditure, productivity, and the preference processes are estimated to be persistent with
AR(1) coe¢ cients of 0.96, 0.92, and 0.88, respectively. The laws of motion for the investment
adjustment cost and the monetary policy rate are relatively less persistent.
3.3 Impulse Responses
To illustrate the role played by the shocks to the FIs￿net worth, we plot the economic
responses to a one standard deviation negative shock to the net worth. An adverse shock to
the net worth causes the downturn in the macroeconomy. The FIs￿low net worth widens the
two spreads, thereby reducing investment and output. Although the shock to the net worth
is a one-time shock and therefore has no inertia, its impacts on the economy are persistent.
15That is, as the demand for capital goods K
￿
st￿




leading to a further decrease in the investment owing to the endogenous declines in the
entrepreneurial net worth as well as the FIs￿net worth.
For the purpose of comparison, we also depict impulse responses to a one standard
deviation negative shock to the entrepreneurial net worth. Time paths of the variables after
the shock are similar to those after the shock to the FIs￿net worth, but larger. As pointed
out in HSU (2009a), for the same size of the shock, a shock to the FIs￿net worth has a greater
economic consequence than that to the entrepreneurial net worth. Since the estimated shocks
to the entrepreneurial net worth are more volatile than those to the FIs￿net worth, giving a
larger standard deviation to the shocks to the entrepreneurial net worth, the one standard
deviation shock to the entrepreneurial sector generates a more severe downturn than that
to the FIs￿net worth.
3.4 Shocks to the FI Sector and Their Contribution
Description of the time series of the shocks to the FIs￿net worth
We now study how the shocks to the FIs￿net worth a⁄ect the credit market and the
real economy throughout the sample period. The solid line with white circles in Figure 3
displays the time series of the shocks (three quarters moving-averaged) with the National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) business cycle periods. The realizations of these
shocks are cyclical, typically taking large negative values during the recession. Particularly,
during the several quarters since 2007, the exogenous net worth decline in the FI sector has
been unprecedentedly deep and persistent.
Compared with the shocks to entrepreneurial net worth that are depicted by the solid
line with black circles in the right scale of Figure 3, variations of shocks to the FIs￿net
worth are relatively moderate. Although the two shock series sometimes move di⁄erently
over the sample period, they simultaneously drop substantially in the recession that began
in 2007. Both series are negatively correlated with the ￿nancial indicators of credit market
stress. For example, the contemporaneous correlations of each of the two shock series (the
shocks to the FIs￿net worth and those to the entrepreneurial net worth) and the BAA -
AAA corporate bond rate are -0.50 and -0.53, respectively, indicating the link between the
decline in the net worth in the borrowing sector and ￿nancial stress.13
13We also study the correlation of the time series of the two shock series and alternative ￿nancial indicators,
16The role played by the shocks to the FIs￿net worth
The shocks to the FIs￿net worth bring about variations in both ￿nancial variables and
real variables. In Figures 4 and 5, we depict the model-generated time path of the FIs￿bor-











.14 The two model-generated series have strong co-movement with the related indicator











the BAA corporate bond rate - FF rate is 0.60, respectively.15 A large portion of upsurge
in the spreads, particularly in the FIs￿borrowing spread since 2007, is attributed to the
negative shocks to the FIs￿net worth. The line with black circles is the model-generated
spread when only shocks to the FIs￿net worth are fed into the model. These time paths
capture the general movements of the spreads￿variations, including the current years.
Figure 6 displays the time path of investment; to see the relative importance of shocks
to FIs￿net worth, we decompose the investment variations into the contribution of each
structural shock. To illustrate, we categorize these shocks into four broad categories. We
include the total factor productivity (TFP) shock "A
t and the investment adjustment cost
shock "I
t in ￿shocks to producers,￿the shocks to the entrepreneurial net worth shock "NE
t
in ￿shocks to entrepreneurs,￿ and the shocks to the FIs￿net worth in ￿shocks to FIs.￿The
rest of the shocks, including the preference shocks "B
t , the exogenous spending shocks "G
t ;
and the monetary policy shocks "R
t , we categorize as ￿other shocks.￿
The shocks to the FIs￿net worth play a quantitatively important but not dominant role
in investment variations. In particular, during the three recessionary episodes included in
our sample period, these shocks drive down the investment substantially. As we discussed
above, their impacts are persistent. In the recessions that began in 1990 and 2001, the shocks
to FIs￿net worth continued to lower investment, even several quarters after the trough of
such as BAA (or AAA) subtracted by the TB rate (or the FF rate). The correlation varies from -0.25 to
-0.45, indicating the signi￿cant relationship.
14In the analysis for both model-implied series and the related actual data, we focus on their business-cycle
components (six quarters to 32 quarters) and extract these components by applying the band-pass ￿lter to
the original series.
15Here, the three-month CD rate and the BAA corporate bond rate serve as the proxy for the FIs￿borrowing




is de￿ned as the policy rate divided by the
aggregate price level in the model, we subtract each series by the FF rate. One other way is to subtract them
by the TB rate. In this case, the contemporaneous correlations are then 0.37 and 0.56, respectively.
17the recessions.
Variance decomposition
To summarize, we report the decomposition of the variations in the two spreads, in-
vestment, output, and in￿ ation in Table 3.16 The shocks to the FIs￿net worth are a main
source of variations in the spreads, particularly in the FIs￿borrowing spread. About 40%
and 20% of the FIs￿borrowing spread and the entrepreneurial spread are attributed to these
shocks. For the macroeconomic variables, these shocks contribute about 15% of investment
variations, and play a comparatively minor role in the variations of other variables. Among
the shocks that are responsible for the investment variations, the contribution of shocks to
the FIs￿net worth is about half of that to the entrepreneurial net worth, indicating that
one-third of shocks originating from the credit market come from the FI sector rather than
the entrepreneurial sector.
3.5 Sensitivity Analysis
We have seen up to now that shocks to the FI sector play a quantitatively important role,
particularly in the U.S. investment variations. In our analysis, we have assumed that shocks
originating in the FI sector take the form of exogenous change in the FIs￿net worth, and
that our benchmark dataset is su¢ cient to identify these shocks. In this section, we conduct
sensitivity tests by incorporating another type of shock to the FI sector and by including
the spread series in the dataset of estimation.
First, while most of the studies on banking shocks concentrate on the shocks that directly
change FIs￿net worth,17 we consider a di⁄erent type of exogenous shock, ￿riskiness shocks,￿
along with the shocks to the net worth. CMR (2008) study the economy in which credit
market imperfection is worsened by the exogenous increase in the variance of borrowers￿
idiosyncratic productivity called ￿riskiness.￿Realization of riskiness is independent of the
net worth shocks, and captures the variations in the external ￿nance premium that does
not stem from the exogenous net worth variations. Closely following CMR (2008), we now
assume that the standard deviations of idiosyncratic productivity shocks of borrowers are
time-variant, so that ￿F
t and ￿E
t obey the laws of motion:
16In calculating the variance decompositions, we ￿rst calculate the volatility of the endogenous variable
conditional on each of the shocks. We then sum these volatilities to calculate the share of each shock.










































innovations, and ￿F and ￿E are the steady state values of riskiness. As shown in HSU
(2009a, 2009b), a rise in either ￿F
t or ￿E
t increases the payment to the lender, causing a
higher external ￿nance premium and a downturn in investment, even when no shocks to net
worth occur.
Second, we reformulate the estimation using the spread data. In the benchmark esti-
mation, we do not employ spread series. This is because in constructing the series that











cators representing overall ￿nancial conditions of the FIs and entrepreneurs are called for.
The data series that exactly match our model series, however, are not available. In fact,
the choice of observable variables di⁄ers across the literature that estimates the ￿nancial
accelerator model. For instance, while Christensen and Dib (2008) and De Graeve (2008)
employ neither series, Nolan and Thoenissen (2009) use only net worth. On the other hand,
CMR (2008) employ the BAA - AAA yield on corporate bonds as a measure of external
￿nance premium in estimation, to distill shocks to the credit market. The second sensitivity
check thus intends to see how our results change if spread series are added to the estimation.
We conduct two alternative formulations, estimation I and estimation II. In estimation
I, we utilize the dataset fCt; GDPt; It; Rn







estimation. In estimation II, we utilize the same dataset as that used in the benchmark
estimation. For both estimations, we incorporate the riskiness shocks as well as the shocks
to net worth in both of the sectors.
The results are shown in Table 4. The estimated impact of the shocks to the FI sector
is robust to incorporating the other type of shock to the FI, and to including the spread
data into the dataset. The contribution of shocks to FIs￿net worth amounts to 18.49% and
15.03% in the investment variations in estimations I and II, respectively.18
18We have also calculated the variance decomposition for the other variables, output, in￿ ation, the FIs￿
borrowing spread, and the entrepreneurial borrowing spread by estimation I and estimation II. Similarly to
the outcomes obtained under benchmark estimation, the contribution of the shocks to the FI sector in the
variations of output and in￿ ation is at most 4%. For the two borrowing spreads, the shocks to the FI sector
account for at least 20% of their variations.
193.6 Importance of Chained Credit Contracts
In contrast to the existing ￿nancial accelerator models, our model introduces the endogenous
developments in the FIs￿net worth and credit market imperfection that originates from them.
To illustrate the implication of this additional source of the ￿nancial accelerator e⁄ect, we
make two comparison analyses in this last subsection.
First, we examine if our model ￿ts the data, compared with the model that abstracts
from the credit market imperfection in the FI sector. To do this, we develop a model called
the ￿BGG model￿ in which entrepreneurs are credit constrained but FIs are not.19 We then





t=1984Q1 for the two models.
The results of this estimation are shown in Table 5.20 The value of the log-likelihood
under the BGG model is signi￿cantly lower than that under the benchmark model, implying
that the latter is more successful at predicting the data. This result indicates the importance
of incorporating the credit-constrained FI sector, since the two models di⁄er only in the FI
sector.21
Second, we ask if introducing shocks to the FIs￿net worth changes our understanding
of the source of the investment variations. Early studies that abstract from the shocks
originating in the credit market report that a bulk of economic variations is attributed to
the shocks to the investment technology. According to Christensen and Dib (2008), more
than 90% of investment variations originate in the shocks to investment e¢ ciency. On the
other hand, Nolan and Thoenissen (2009), based on the model that does not incorporate
shocks to the investment technology, report that shocks originating in the credit market
are important. Because our model has both shocks to the credit market and those to the
investment adjustment technology, we can separate the former from the latter.
To illustrate the role played by the shocks to the FIs￿net worth, we estimate one other
19This BGG model employs the same setting as the ￿nancial accelerator model of BGG (1999). The
only di⁄erence is that we estimate some of the model parameters rather than calibrate them in our BGG
model. A full description of the BGG model is provided in Appendix C. In estimating the model, we estimate
parameters f￿; ￿; ￿p; ￿; ￿￿; ￿yg and shock processes f￿A; ￿I; ￿B; ￿G; ￿R; ￿A; ￿I; ￿B; ￿G; ￿R;;￿NEg;






t=1984Q1: The rest of the parameters are calibrated to the U.S.
economy.
20In estimating the benchmark model for Table 5, we do not use the data of the FIs￿net worth, so that
the outcomes are comparable between the BGG model and the benchmark model.
21Christensen and Dib (2008) conclude using the log-likelihood ratio test that their ￿nancial accelerator
model outperforms the model that abstracts from the ￿nancial accelerator e⁄ect.
20model, which we call the ￿Non-FA model,￿ 22 where no credit market imperfection prevails in
the economy, along with the BGG model and the benchmark model by a Bayesian method.23
Table 6 reports the variance decompositions of investment under the three models. Under
the Non-FA model, a bulk of the variations comes from the shocks to investment adjustment
cost "I
t. When shocks originating in the credit market are incorporated, however, the contri-
bution of these shocks is reduced. The estimated contribution of "I
t is 54.42% and 35.24%,
respectively, in the BGG model and the benchmark model. On the other hand, a signi￿cant
portion of investment variations is attributed to the shocks originating in the credit market
under the two models.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have quantitatively assessed the role played by the shocks to the FIs￿net
worth in the U.S. business cycle. To this end, we have estimated and simulated the ￿nancial
accelerator model in HSU (2009a, 2009b), in which FIs along with entrepreneurs are credit
constrained. In this model, once net worth in the FI sector falls, the cost of external ￿nance
increases, reducing investment. Consequently, endogenous developments in the FIs￿ net
worth as well those in the entrepreneurial net worth become a key to the ampli￿cation and
propagation mechanism in the economy.
Employing a Bayesian method, we have distilled the shocks to the FIs￿net worth from
the U.S. dataset that includes the FIs￿net worth. These shocks typically take negative
values during a recession, particularly during the one that began in 2007. According to
the variance decomposition, these shocks are one of the main sources of the variations in
the ￿nancial variables. They account for 39% of the FIs￿borrowing spread and 23% of
the entrepreneurial borrowing spread. At the same time, their role is important but not
dominant in the variations of the macroeconomic variables. These shocks contribute 15% of
investment variations, 3% of the output variations, and 4% of the in￿ ation variations.
22We provide a full description of the Non-FA model in Appendix C. For the Non-FA model, we estimate
parameters f￿; ￿; ￿p; ￿; ￿￿; ￿yg and shock processes f￿A; ￿I; ￿B; ￿G; ￿R; ￿A; ￿I; ￿B; ￿G; ￿Rg; ; using the




t=1984Q1: The rest of the parameters are calibrated to the U.S. economy.
23In estimating the benchmark model for Table 6, we employ the full dataset including the FIs￿net worth.
21A Credit Contract
In this section, we discuss how the contents of the two credit contracts are determined by
the pro￿t maximization problem of the FIs. We ￿rst explain how the FIs earn pro￿t from
the credit contracts, and then explain the participation constraints of the other participants
in the credit contracts.







share of FIs earnings received by the FI
z }| { ￿


















is a probability weight for state st+1 for given state st: Here, the expected
return on the loans to entrepreneurs, RF ￿
st+1jst￿
is given by
share of entrepreneurial earnings received by the FI





























This equation indicates that the two credit contracts determine the FIs￿pro￿ts. In the FE
contract, the FIs receive a portion of what entrepreneurs earn from their projects as their
gross pro￿t. In the IF contract, the FIs receive a portion of what they receive from the FE
contract as their net pro￿t, and pay the rest to the investors.
There is a participation constraint in each of the credit contracts. In the FE contract, the
entrepreneurs￿expected return is set to equal to the return from their alternative option. We
assume that without participating in the FE contract, entrepreneurs can purchase capital
goods with their own net worth NE ￿
st￿
: Note that the expected return from this option




. Therefore the FE contract is agreed by the entrepreneurs only
when the following inequality is expected to hold:
share of entrepreneurial earnings kept by the entrepreneur



















We next consider a participation constraint of the investors in the IF contract. We
assume that there is a risk free rate of return in the economy R
￿
st￿
; and investors may
alternatively invest in this asset. Consequently, for investors to join the IF contract, the
loans to the FIs must equal the opportunity cost of lending. That is
share of FIs￿earnings received by the investors







































; subject to the investors￿participation constraint (29) and entre-












































































Using equations (27) and (29), we obtain the equation (1) in the text.
23B Equilibrium Conditions of the Benchmark Model
In this appendix, we describe the equilibrium system of our benchmark model. We
express it in ￿ve blocks of equations.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(5) Policies and Shock Process
Policies for the shock process are given by equations (15), (16), (19), (20), (21), (22) and
(23).
27C Equilibrium Conditions of Alternative Models
In addition to the benchmark model, we consider two alternative models for comparative
convenience. The ￿rst is the ￿Non-FA model￿in which no ￿nancial accelerator mechanism is
incorporated. The equilibrium conditions under this model are given by equations (15), (16),
(19), (20), (21), (22), (23), (31), (32), (33), (35), (36), (37), (38), and (48), and the following


































The second model is the ￿BGG model￿ in which only entrepreneurs are credit con-
strained. The equilibrium conditions in this model are given by equations (7), (15), (16),
(19), (20), (21), (22), (23), (31), (32), (33), (35), (36), (37), (38), (40), (42), (44), (46) and
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Figure 1: Time series of observables from 1984Q1 to 2009Q2. Variables except the FF rate are
￿rst di⁄erenced. Shaded quarters are the periods between the peak and trough of the NBER
business cycle.









































-4 FI Borrowing Spread












Figure 2: Impulse responses to the negative one standard deviation shock to the FIs￿net


















Shocks to FI's Net Worth
Shocks to Entrepreneurial Net Worth (right scale)
Figure 3: The estimated shocks to FIs￿net worth and entrepreneurial net worth. Shaded
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the spread between CD three-months and the FF rate. All series are ￿ltered by the band pass
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Ze - r (model, shocks to FIs' net worth only)
Ze - r (model)
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; and the spread between BAA rated corporate bonds and the FF rate. All
series are ￿ltered by the band pass ￿lter. Shaded quarters are those between the peak and
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Figure 6: Historical decomposition of U.S. aggregate investment. (year-on-year % change,




￿ .99 Discount factor
￿ .025 Depreciation rate
￿ .35 Capital share
R .99￿1 Risk free rate
￿ 6 Degree of substitutability
￿ 3 Elasticity of labor
￿ .3 Utility weight on leisure
GY ￿1 .2 Share of government expenditure at steady state
24Figures are quarterly unless otherwise noted.
37Table 1B: Calibrated Parameters25
Parameter Value Description
￿F 0.107366 S.E. of FIs￿idiosyncratic productivity at steady state
￿E 0.312687 S.E. of entrepreneurial idiosyncratic productivity at steady state
￿F 0.033046 bankruptcy cost associated with FIs
￿E 0.013123 bankruptcy cost associated with entrepreneurs
￿F 0.963286 Survival rate of FIs
￿E 0.983840 Survival rate of entrepreneurs
Table 1C: Steady State Conditions
Condition Description
R =.99￿1 Risk-free rate is the inverse of the subjective discount factor.
ZE = ZF + :023:25 Premium for entrepreneurial borrowing rate is :023:25:








= :02 Default probability in the FE contract is .02:
nF = :1 FIs￿net worth/capital ratio is set to .1
nE = :5 Entrepreneurial net worth/capital ratio is set to .5.
25Figures are quarterly unless otherwise noted.
38Table 2: Parameter Estimates
Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Distr. Mean St. Dev. Mean 5% 95%
￿ Beta 0.5 0.15 0.7866 0.7100 0.8712
￿ Normal 4 1.5 7.2085 5.4124 9.0542
￿p Beta 0.5 0.2 0.1042 0.0123 0.2017
￿ Beta 0.75 0.1 0.7427 0.6971 0.7921
￿￿ Normal 1.5 0.125 1.4671 1.3100 1.6223
￿y Normal 0.125 0.05 0.0404 0.0124 0.0660
￿B Beta 0.5 0.2 0.8757 0.8403 0.9131
￿I Beta 0.5 0.2 0.6867 0.5839 0.7965
￿A Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9204 0.8654 0.9717
￿G Beta 0.5 0.2 0.9558 0.9330 0.9807
￿R Beta 0.5 0.2 0.2080 0.0922 0.3253
￿B Inv. Gamma 0.01 2 0.0022 0.0016 0.0029
￿I Inv. Gamma 0.01 2 0.0079 0.0061 0.0095
￿G Inv. Gamma 0.01 2 0.0043 0.0038 0.0048
￿A Inv. Gamma 0.01 2 0.0098 0.0070 0.0131
￿R Inv. Gamma 0.01 2 0.0018 0.0016 0.0021
￿NE Inv. Gamma 0.01 2 0.1790 0.1588 0.1999
￿NF Inv. Gamma 0.01 2 0.0407 0.0354 0.0453
Log likelihood 2172.43255






























Category var(It) var(GDPt) var(￿t)
Shocks to "A
t 4.61 27.26 42.67
Producers and "I
t 30.79 9.68 2.89
Entrepreneurs "
NE
t 37.13 6.27 4.43
sum 72.53 43.21 49.99
Shocks to FI "
NF
t 15.32 3.16 4.28
Other Shocks "b
t 3.86 29.94 27.68
"
g
t 0.06 12.08 0.07
"r
t 8.23 11.60 17.98
sum 12.15 53.63 45.73
Note: The estimated share of variance accounted for by each shock is reported. Numbers are the
average of 1984Q2 to 2009Q2.
40Table 4: Sensitivity of Variance Decomposition of Investment
Category Benchmark Estimation I Estimation II
Shocks to "A
t 4.61 1.56 4.47
Producers and "I
t 30.79 27.60 34.22
Entrepreneurs "
NE




sum 72.53 59.80 73.34
Shocks to "
NF




sum 15.32 19.40 14.98
Other Shocks "b
t 3.86 0.57 3.53
"
g
t 0.06 0.08 0.06
"r
t 8.23 19.57 8.10
sum 12.15 20.21 11.68
Note: The estimated share of variance accounted for by each shock is reported. Numbers are the
average of 1984Q2 to 2009Q2.
41Table 5: Likelihood Comparison
Benchmark: Chained BGG BGG
Log likelihood 2117:9 2113:1
Posterior distribution Posterior distribution
Mean 5% 95% Mean 5% 95%
￿p 0.6427 0.5626 0.7147 0.6631 0.5906 0.7246
￿ 7.1747 5.5340 9.2229 5.6593 3.8576 7.6968
￿p 0.2504 0.0581 0.4429 0.2082 0.0294 0.3905
￿ 0.6235 0.5615 0.6882 0.6392 0.5822 0.7046
￿￿ 1.8519 1.7030 2.0254 1.7896 1.6158 1.9401
￿y 0.0057 -0.0263 0.0364 -0.0007 -0.0293 0.0255
￿B 0.8782 0.8465 0.9156 0.8721 0.8386 0.9051
￿I 0.5328 0.4158 0.7452 0.6015 0.4922 0.7257
￿A 0.9751 0.9576 0.9937 0.9726 0.9543 0.9919
￿G 0.9464 0.9236 0.9744 0.9450 0.9216 0.9684
￿R 0.5283 0.4362 0.6107 0.5113 0.4159 0.5998
￿B 0.0019 0.0014 0.0023 0.0020 0.0015 0.0024
￿I 0.0099 0.0074 0.0117 0.0090 0.0070 0.0108
￿G 0.0044 0.0039 0.0049 0.0044 0.0040 0.0049
￿A 0.0069 0.0058 0.0078 0.0071 0.0061 0.0082
￿R 0.0019 0.0016 0.0022 0.0018 0.0016 0.0021
￿NE 0.1876 0.1658 0.2092 0.1984 0.1761 0.2204
￿NF 0.0187 0.0020 0.0303
42Table 6: Variance Decomposition of Investment under Di⁄erent Models
Category Non FA BGG Chained BGG
Shocks to "A
t 13.19 12.08 4.02
Producers and "I










t 11.81 13.32 3.33
"
g
t 0.00 0.02 0.05
"r
t 0.19 0.77 8.30
sum 12.00 14.11 11.66
Note: The estimated share of variance accounted for by each shock is reported. Numbers are the
average of 1984Q2 to 2009Q2.
43